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ANOTHER REFERENCE: ROME
A COMMENT ON NANCY’S DECONSTRUCTION
OF CHRISTIANITY AND HIS THESIS ON THE IMPOSSIBILITY
OF CIVIL RELIGION
MARIN TERPSTRA
“The various modes of worship, which prevailed in the Roman world, were
all considered by the people, as equally true; by the philosopher, as equally
false; and by the magistrate, as equally useful. And thus toleration produced
not only mutual indulgence, but even religious concord.”1
“L’identité chrétienne est donc d’entrée de jeu une constitution par
autodépassement: […] la civitas dans la civitas Dei, etc.”2
In the ‘Ouverture’ to his work, La déclosion, Nancy warns us not to be too con-
fident that the Enlightenment and secularization has done away with religion.
Reason itself has been weakened by reducing itself to rationality. What we
need is a “piété de la raison” – reason in the sense of Hegel’s Vernunft. To
prevent politics from being conquered again by a resurrection of religious fer-
vor, we have to develop a new politics that does justice to reason. Political
order lacks a final meaning and foundation. Rousseau pointed to this defect
when he suggested the need for a civil religion. Even democracy seems to be
in need of something that politics itself cannot provide, which animates the pas-
sion of being together. The alternative is between a “hyperfascisme” (in which
democratic politics reshapes itself by using a new variety of religion) and a
reinvention of what “laïcisme” means.3
1 Edward Gibbon, The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, Everyman’s Library, New
York/London/Toronto 1993, Chapter II, p. 34.
2 Jean-Luc Nancy, ‘La déconstruction du christianisme’, p. 212. The text dates from 1995 and was
published earlier in Études philosophique (no..4, 1998); now it reappears in La Déclosion (Décon-
struction du christianisme, 1), Galilée, Paris 2005.
3 O.c., p. 14.
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The aim of this paper is to show that this opposition of extremes emerges from
a particular view on the ‘theopolitical’ history of the west, in which Chris-
tianity plays a decisive role. Especially Nancy’s view on the problem of ‘civil
religion’ is determined by a ‘Christian’ view on religion. For Nancy, Chris-
tianity seems to represent a threefold political event. Firstly, it spiritualizes
political order. Secondly, it liberates politics from religion (and religion from
politics) by making the first a completely human affair and the second an affair
of God. Thirdly, it delegitimizes any community based on political power.
Man-made order is imperfect by definition. Community becomes transcendent.
As Christians would say, it will only be attained in God’s Kingdom. Not only
is Christianity “la religion de la sortie de la religion”4, it is a spiritual move-
ment that makes civil religion suspect. Christianity contains the roots of a fun-
damental resistance to ‘political theology’.5 In this line of thought, Nancy
seems to reject all forms of state cult, that is any fusion of the autonomy of
politics and the heteronomy of religion, even all secular varieties praising the
state in the name of communitarian principles such as fraternity, justice and so
on. With his rejection of, or at least resistance to, civil religion from a Chris-
tian point of view, Nancy takes sides in a well-known debate, which started
with Erik Peterson’s theological denunciation of political theology, a critique
of Carl Schmitt, to which the latter responded more than thirty years later.6 This
controversy shows that it is possible to reframe Nancy’s thesis by saying that
a certain interpretation of Christianity, itself a particular worldview, makes
resistance to civil religion inevitable. There is no proof in Nancy’s text of other
possible points of view than a Christian one, and no other interpretations of
Christianity. In fact, the whole debate on civil religion refers to a clash of dif-
ferent conceptions of political order and human society (being together), also
within the Christian world. Deconstructing Christianity should therefore also
take into consideration the inner tensions within Christianity and the tensions
with other worldviews that produced Christianity in the first place. So, there
Marin Terpstra 265
4 Nancy depends heavily on Marcel Gauchet’s thesis of Christianity as the religion for departing
from religion, “la religion de la sortie de la religion”, in Le désenchantement du monde. Une histoire
politique de la religion, Gallimard, Paris 1985, p. 133.
5 This is the thesis of Nancy in a recent text: ‘Church, State, Resistance’, in Hent de Vries, and
Lawrence E. Sullivan (eds.), Political Theologies. Public Religion in a Post-Secular World, Fordham
University Press, New York 2006, pp. 102-112.
6 Erik Peterson, Der Monotheismus als politisches Problem: ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der poli-
tischen Theologie im Imperium Romanum, Hegner, Leipzig 1935; Carl Schmitt, Politische Theolo-
gie II. Die Legende von der Erledigung jeder Politischen Theologie, Duncker & Humblot,
Berlin 1970.
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is enough reason to dig a little deeper into this question and examine the con-
frontation between a ‘Roman’ point of view (favouring civil religion) and a
‘Christian’ point of view (rejecting civil religion). There is hardly any better
example of this confrontation than Augustine’s criticism, mainly in chapters 4
and 6 of his De Civitate Dei, of the Roman political theology, as explained by
Terentius Varro. By revisiting this ancient confrontation, I hope to shed some
light on the premises of Nancy’s thesis.
1. Deconstruction of Christianity
In the opening paragraphs of his paper, ‘La deconstruction du christianisme’7,
one gets the impression that Nancy is referring to a particular community, peo-
ple who share some basic ideas about the world, society and human life. Is it
the community of secularized, modern people, the majority of those living in
some of the main countries of ‘old Europe’? Nancy addresses his words only
to these people, confronting them with a question concerning their intellectual
roots. Are they sure that their thoughts are post-Christian? This impression
puzzles me. Who or what is “we” and “our tradition” introduced in these
opening sections? Nancy appears to be addressing his text to a much smaller
audience than ‘the secularized world’. He is talking to philosophers or,
even more specifically, to phenomenological philosophers such as Husserl,
Heidegger and Derrida (with a view on Nietzsche8). Nancy also seems to be
talking from a position in which ‘laicism’ is a matter of course. In this partic-
ular context, the reference to Athens and Jerusalem, “le ‘juif-grec’” (Derrida),
is predominant. According to Nancy, these philosophers hardly appreciate what
they owe to Christianity, while at the same time fully recognizing their com-
mitment to the Jewish and ancient Greek traditions of thought.9 Nietzsche knew
this well. Nancy tries to take up this line of thought without losing sight of the
fact that in our world Christianity itself has dissolved.10 Christianity no longer
266 Another Reference: Rome 
7 On p. 203, o.c., we read: “Ma question sera très simple, naïve même comme il convient peut-être
au départ d’une démarche phénoménologique: en quoi et jusqu’à quel point tenons-nous au christian-
isme? comment exactement sommes-nous, dans toute notre tradition, tenus par lui?” (Italics by Nancy).
8 Nancy refers to Nietzsche’s Der Antichrist, section 8 (“Alles, was Theologen-Blut im Leibe hat
– unsre ganze Philosophie”).
9 O.c., p. 204: “on pourrait se demander si le»juif-grec«… n’est pas le chrétien.”
10 As a confession of faith, which he strangely enough calls “précepts”, Nancy states that Chris-
tianity can only be recognized as a tradition that has dissolved (itself), but that atheism cannot be
understood without its Christian roots. See o.c., pp. 204-205. So, his question is what this ambivalent
bond to Christianity (being a Christian without being a Christian) means.
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is the centre of our worldview, what Nancy calls “l’ordre du sens”. There is
no longer any need to attack or to defend Christianity. We have to ask rather
whether Christianity is the process in which any “régime de sens” is dissolved.
The shadow of Christianity in which we are living is the openness of our cul-
ture. So, Christianity should be a third reference for contemporary philosophy.
2. Nancy’s references and one that remains marginal
My aim in this paper is to draw attention to yet another reference, which I think
is important for our understanding of Western civilization, but which Nancy
tends to neglect. I think that it is no surprise that this reference is less philo-
sophical, and more political. This reference is to Rome – the Roman Empire,
ancient Roman thought. It is true, for most philosophers, Roman thought is
seen as merely a recapturing of the great thinkers of Athens. In the history of
political philosophy, however, the reference to Rome is inevitable.11 In the
political history of the West, the translatio imperii, the continuation of the
Roman Empire in new forms, has played an immense role for centuries. There
was even a predominant theology of history in which the Roman reference
was identical to Christianity.12 Modern political thought, from Machiavelli to
Rousseau at least, is unthinkable without the reference to Rome. The example
of the Roman Empire was present in the French Revolution, but also in the
attempts of modern states to become ‘sacred’ institutions, attempts which in
its most excessive forms ended in Fascism and National Socialism. Carl
Schmitt once wrote that there exists an “anti-Roman affect”.13 This makes
clear the sense in which the association of Christianity with “le»juif-grec«”
is not only a sign of a polemical stance, but also of the limited context of
Nancy’s approach, at least in his ‘La déconstruction du christianisme’. I do
not mean to say that his questions are not pertinent. What I want to make clear
Marin Terpstra 267
11 In ‘State, Church, Resistance’, o.c., Nancy acknowledges this impact of ‘Rome’, but mainly in
a negative sense.
12 Endre von Ivánka, Rhomäerreich und Gottesvolk. Das Glaubens-, Staats- und Volksbewusst-
sein der Byzantiner und seine Auswirkung auf die ostkrichlich-osteuropäische Geisteshaltung, Ver-
lag Karl Alber, Freiburg/München 1968 (especially the first part is of a more general character, show-
ing how Rome was relevant for western Christianity as well); Joseph Ratzinger, ‘The Spiritual Roots
of Europe: Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow’, in Joseph Ratzinger, and Marcello Pera, Without Roots.
The West, Relativism, Christianity, Islam, Basic Books, New York 2006.
13 Carl Schmitt, Römischer Katholizismus und politische Form, Jakob Hegner, Hellerau 1923,
p. 7: “Es gibt einen anti-römischen Affekt. Aus ihm nährt sich jener Kampf gegen Papismus, Jesui-
tismus und Klerikalismus, der einige Jahrhunderte europäischer Geschichte bewegt, mit einem riesen-
haften Aufgebot von religiösen und politischen Energien.”
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in this paper is the relevance of the reference to Rome, both in its negative and
its positive manifestations. Both manifestations are part of the dispersed iden-
tity of the West (or Europe). In my view, Christianity marks not just a
hermeneutic revolution (that is what Nancy is talking about), but also a break-
through in the history of the “theological-political problem”.14
Of course, Nancy is well aware of the fact that the Roman Empire is the birth-
place of Christianity. He rejects the view (the myth) that Christianity fell from
the sky. Christianity is not an ‘auto-construction’, but emerges from a specific
background. We should ask why this happened. Christianity negated and inte-
grated three traditions: Jerusalem, Athens, and Rome. This negation and inte-
gration mark three phases in the early history of Christianity. Starting as a
Jewish sect, it becomes a quasi-philosophical outlook and finally transforms
itself into a political theology of the Roman Empire, with fragmented contin-
uation in later ages. Nancy, as I said, is interested in the hermeneutical process,
the re-interpretation of traditions15, which can be seen as the essence of Chris-
tianity itself. It is orthodoxy in a constant movement of re-interpreting itself.16
Nancy suggests that deconstruction of Christianity is part of Christianity itself.17
My aim is to comment on this hermeneutic approach of Christianity, by show-
ing that it is typical of the Christian anti-Roman position. It is rooted in a tra-
dition that moved away from (civil) religion as orthopraxy18, and turned com-
pletely to the realm of orthodoxy and its counterpart, heterodoxy. As a
hermeneutical-historical process of re-interpretation, Christianity cannot but
dissolve itself because it takes interpretation (or what Nancy calls sens) too seri-
ously. Nancy’s programmatic essay shows a paradoxical thesis. On the one
hand, it stresses the difference between text and interpretation, beginning and
tradition, ‘father’ and ‘son’, in order to install philosophical thought in the
resulting void, in which meaning becomes uncertain (infinite). On the other
hand, Nancy claims that precisely this philosophical approach is in line with
268 Another Reference: Rome 
14 Leo Strauss invented this phrase. See Heinrich Meier, Leo Strauss and the Politico-Theological
Problem, translation Marcus Brainard, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006.
15 Nancy, o.c., p. 212: “L’identité chrétienne est donc d’entrée de jeu une constitution par auto-
dépassement: la Loi ancienne dans la Loi nouvelle, le logos dans le Verbe, la civitas dans la civitas
Dei, etc.”
16 Nancy, o.c., p. 212: “la foi chrétienne est elle-même l’expérience de son histoire”.
17 Nancy, o.c., pp. 215-216: “Mon hypothèse est que le geste de déconstruction, en tant que geste
qui n’est ni critique ni perpétuateur, et en tant que geste témoignant d’un rapport à l’histoire et à la
tradition qu’on ne peut trouver ni chez Husserl, ni chez Hegel, ni chez Kant, n’est précisément pos-
sible qu’à l’intérieur du christianisme …”.
18 See John Scheid, Quand faire, c’est croire, Aubier Montaigne, Paris 2005, and Religion et piété
à Rome, Albin Michel, Paris 2001.
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the essence of Christianity, thereby claiming that his interpretation is the only
valid one. Of course, this paradox itself is part of the problem he raises.
The openness of Christianity (appearing in theology as reservatio), due to
the acknowledgement of the distance between man and God, can only lead to
a proliferation of interpretations, even of interpretations of what ‘the essence’
of Christianity is. There is no ‘we’ and no ‘our tradition’ at all, except that
‘we all’ play a part in the continuing battle of ideas.
An appeal to Nietzsche, Nancy’s witness, is always precarious. He also con-
trasted Christianity with ancient morality, as a religion of pity. Christianity
revolved the traditional (aristocratic) values of Roman republicanism. It turned
pietas into pity19, the love for the institutions and authorities of one’s country
to the love of God and of one’s neighbour.20 The spiritual revolution of Chris-
tianity itself in its struggle with its opponents is part of ‘our tradition’ too,
and therefore of western identity. A philosophy identifying itself with Chris-
tianity and its inherent deconstruction runs the risk of becoming blind to this
inner opposition of the West. To get a better idea of what is at stake in this
opposition and in what respect the neglect of it affects Nancy’s project, I will
explore in some detail one exemplum of the contrast between the two cultures
or moralities. In fact, I will examine Augustine’s criticism of Roman theology21
as exemplified by the doctrine of the three kinds of theology by Terentius
Varro.
Halfway through the first century BC, Varro wrote a large work in which he
reconstructed traditional Roman religion.22 Varro began this work, because he
felt that the Roman citizens had forgotten traditional religion. Therefore, the
Roman Empire was in decline. The work he finished (consisting of 41 books),
the Antiquitates Rerum Humanarum et Divinarum, was welcomed by Caesar.
It was used by the political elite to strengthen the role of public religion. It was
the beginning of the establishment of an imperial cult, which was one thing the
Marin Terpstra 269
19 This shift is documented in James D. Garrison, Pietas from Vergil to Dryden, The Pennsylva-
nia State University Press, University Park, Pennsylvania 1992.
20 See also Nancy’s ‘State, Church, Resistance’, o.c., pp. 109-110.
21 It is often forgotten that theology is an ancient invention (Plato, Politeia, 379a), further elabo-
rated mainly by Roman stoic philosophers. Originally, the theologoi were the people who wrote plays.
Only later did the term become synonymous with Christian theology.
22 The text was reconstructed by B. Cardauns: M. Terentius Varro. Antiquitates Rerum Divinarum.
Teil I: Die Fragmente. Teil II: Kommentar (Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur. Abhand-
lungen der Geistes- und Sozialwissenschaftlichen Klasse. Einzelveröffentlichung), Franz Steiner Ver-
lag, Mainz 1976. For the history and context of the doctrine, see G. Lieberg, ‘Die “theologia triper-
tita” in Forschung und Bezeugung’, in Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt, 1.4, Tübingen
1973, pp. 63-115.
1525-08_Bijdr_08-3_02_Terpstra  09-09-2008  17:11  Pagina 269
early Christians opposed.23 Augustine made use of Varro’s work in his criti-
cism of Roman religion. Most of the fragments we still have of Varro’s books
are gathered from Augustine’s The City of God. The original manuscripts did
not survive.
3. The creation of meaning in the city
In the opening paragraph of the sixth book of The City of God, Augustine, not
without irony as we shall see, quotes Cicero celebrating Varro’s Antiquitates.
“We were like strangers in our own town, visitors who had lost their way. It was your
books that, as it were, brought us back home, so that at last we could recognize who we
were, and where we were.”24
For more than one reason, this quotation is very instructive. We first recognize
a main scheme of a community structured by a reference and even a return to
an ideal past.25 The identity of the Romans, of the Roman Empire, of its citi-
zens and the many nations it contains, is created by reconstructing the ances-
tral religion, the religion of the founding fathers of Rome. This religion has
proven successful. After the period of civil war in Rome in the first century
BC, Varro’s project was to re-establish unity by bringing the Romans back to
their roots. Cicero clearly states that Rome’s alienation could be cured by
finding out what Rome’s identity really was. In the state of alienation, this
identity is only visible in the outward appearances of statues, temples, and so
on. In fact, it was almost lost. Cicero himself, a companion of Varro, did have
more reservations towards the trend of strengthening traditional public religion,
270 Another Reference: Rome 
23 Rejection of the cult of the Emperor was one reason why Christianity was declared an illegal
religion, religio illicita.
24 City of God, 6.2 (translation by Henry Bettenson, in Augustine, Concerning the City of God
against the Pagans, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth 1986, p. 229). The quotation is from Cicero’s
Academia (1.3.9.) and continues as follows: “It was you who revealed to us the age of our coun-
try, the sequence of events, the laws of religious ceremonies and of the priesthoods, the traditional
costumes of private and public life, the position of geographical areas and of particular places, and
the terminology of all matters human and divine, with their various kinds, and functions, and
causes.”
25 Nancy discusses this theme in La communauté désoeuvrée, Christian Bourgeois, Paris 1983.
See also R. Bernasconi, ‘On deconstructing nostalgia for community within the West: the debate
between Nancy and Blanchot’, in Research in Phenomenology, 23(1993), pp. 3-21. Nancy is explor-
ing a form of community not closing itself by a compulsory reference to an original identity, which
should be re-established. He longs for a community remaining open to (new) meaning. In this light,
Augustine’s (Christian) criticism of the Roman political-theological project gains interest.
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especially by Julius Caesar.26 Later on, he would write a sharp criticism of
divination. Although he must have read the books of Varro, he never made use
of them. This fact points to an important development within the Roman intel-
lectual and political elite, which did not escape the attention of Augustine.
Secondly, we read in this quotation a key metaphor of Augustine: living as a
stranger in this world.27 Being a stranger in one’s own city is having become
a positivist sociologist of religion, observing data without really understand-
ing what is inside of it, without the competence to make sense of it. He sees
statues, temples and processions, he observes what people say and do, but he
cannot figure out what it means. The meaning has been lost, until Varro wrote
his book and gave meaning to all the aspects of Roman religion, of which only
the outer appearance had remained. The meaning made these things and facts
to res mixtae again, things belonging to this world and to the divine world at
the same time. As we shall see, Augustine’s criticism aims at showing that
this meaning is one big lie, and that Varro knew it.
Here comes into play the distinction between three kinds of theology, found
by Augustine in the work of Varro. According to this doctrine (or rather:
“intellectual model”28) there are three kinds of theology: mythical theology
(produced by the poets), natural theology (produced by philosophers) and polit-
ical theology (produced by lawgivers). These theologies have their place in
three locations: the theatre, the city and nature. The divine appears differently
in the theatre (in imagination), in the city (in politics), and in the minds of
those who search for the true nature of the gods (in reason). In book 4, chap-
ter 27, Augustine also informs us that the same distinction is used by Scaevola,
a high priest in Rome who lived a little earlier than Varro. In the quotation
I used as a motto, Gibbon is referring to the same distinction.29
Gibbon is not the only one in the eighteenth century to contrast the religious
tolerance in Rome with the doctrinal intolerance of Christianity. Rome is used
Marin Terpstra 271
26 Arnoldo Momigliano, ‘The Theological Efforts of the Roman Upper Classes in the First Cen-
tury BC’, in Clifford Ando, Clifford Ando (ed.), Roman Religion, Edinburg University Press, Edin-
burg 2003, pp. 147-163; originally in Classical Philology, 79(1984)3, pp. 199-211.
27 Literally a pilgrim: for example, Abel is called “a citizen of the Eternal City, on pilgrimage in
this world” (City of God, o.c., 15.5, p. 600), but this obtains for all men: “so long as he is in this
mortal body, he is a pilgrim in a foreign land, away from God’ (City of God, o.c., 19.14, p. 873).
28 G. Lieberg, ‘The theologia tripertita as an intellectual model in antiquity’, in The Journal of
Indo-European Studies (Monograph Series No. 4: Edgar C. Polomé, ed., Essays In Memory of Karl
Kerènyi), 1984, pp. 91-115.
29 The distinction seems to be a common place in the eighteenth century. The source is Augus-
tine. I did not find any earlier references. My colleague, Machiel Karskens, drew my attention to
La scienza nuovo (third edition, 1744) in which Giambatista Vico mentions the Theologia Tripertita.
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as a polemical counterexample, a point to which I shall return. Recent research
has made more clear what Varro’s project means. The Romans were anxious
to stick to the forms of public life, especially religious rituals: the right way
to honour the gods.30 It was of great importance, therefore, to know exactly
what the formal requirements were. Much of it has been lost; or was corrupted.
Varro contributed to a restoration of Roman religion. The political inevitabil-
ity for this was clear: Rome’s imperial policy needed instruments for integra-
tion of its occupied territories and its people.31 Religious politics was one of
these instruments. Foreign gods and rituals had to be respected and integrated,
but Rome’s religious identity also had to be preserved.
For Varro, the relation to the gods was a human affair. In fact, the main point
of the distinction of three kinds of theology was the reference to three human
sources of our knowledge about the gods: poets, philosophers and magistrates.
They all use a different language, a different practice to honour the gods, and
a different view of what the gods are and do. For Varro, there was only the
pragmatic question of how to deal with these differences. At the bottom line,
therefore, we find a genuine sceptical attitude, preventing fanaticism in both
directions – in denying or in affirming the existence of the gods. The gods
were there, in human society. And that is all there is.
Although Augustine cannot be said to be a fanatic, he had serious trouble with
this sceptical position. Here is a long quotation, which shows what he makes
of Varro’s project:
“So let our friends go and try (and good luck to them!) to use all their subtlety to make a
distinction between ‘civil’ and ‘fabulous’ theology, between the city and the theatre, the
temple and the stage, priestly ceremonies and poets’ verses – a supposed distinction between
decency and obscenity, truth and falsehood, solemnity and frivolity, the serious and the far-
cical, between what is to be desired and what is to be rejected. We understand their motives.
They know that the theology of the theatre and of fable depends on their ‘civil’ theology,
which is reflected in the verses of the poets as in a mirror. They have not the courage to
condemn ‘civil’ theology, but they give a detailed exposition of it, and then criticize its
reflection in terms of reprobation. The purpose of this is that those who perceive their
intention may also repudiate the original, of which this is a reflection. As for the gods, they
look at themselves in the same mirror, and are so enamoured of what they see, that they
can be more clearly recognized, in both reflection and original, for who they are and what
272 Another Reference: Rome 
30 Cardauns writes in his comment that Varro’s intention was to write a practical guide to Roman
religion: “Seine Absicht ist also, ein praktisches Handbuch der römischen Religion zu liefern, das
jeder Römer benutzen kann” (o.c., p. 245).
31 John Scheid, ‘Cults, Myths, and Politics at the Beginning of the Empire’, in Clifford Ando, o.c.,
pp. 117-138; originally in F. Graf (ed.), Mythos in mythenloser Gesellschaft: Das Paradigma Roms,
Teubner, Stuttgart 1993, pp. 109-127.
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they are. […] For the present, I have followed the distinctions made by Varro, and I believe
that I have sufficiently shown that both the theology of the city and the theology of the the-
atre belong to one division, namely, ‘civil’ theology. Hence, since they are both alike in
their indecency, their absurdity, their unworthiness, their falsity, heaven forbid that any
man of genuine religion should hope for life eternal from either of them.”32
The point Augustine wants to make is that Varro’s reconstruction of Roman
religion is mainly concerned with the work of the poets – that is, stories about
the gods. This mythical theology is the context of public religion, of the state
cult, of political theology. Although Varro as a philosopher did not believe in
these stories, he nevertheless was reluctant to show his unbelief, because he
was afraid to reject public religion openly. According to Augustine, Varro was
a hypocrite, or at least, he was not frank.33 He refused parrhèsia. Augustine
himself, while using the material produced by Varro, was not afraid to tell the
truth in public. In short, his point of view is that Roman religion is totally man
made, a product of human fantasy, and therefore merely lies. Political theology,
based on these lies, cannot be anything else than theatre. This is proof that the
Romans did not honour their gods, but defiled them. Implicitly, Varro gives
an affirmation of this thesis by suggesting that the truth can only be found in
natural theology, a philosophical treatment of the gods. Natural theology claims
that the gods are only allegorical figures, referring to natural phenomena.
Augustine fully agrees with this.
4. Augustine’s religious criticism
Augustine’s City of God presents a famous, influential and systematic doctrine
of Christianity’s attitude towards politics, known as the doctrine of the Two
Cities, the secular city and the heavenly city. The book was written in the
beginning of the fifth century. Christianity already had been elevated to the sta-
tus of official religion of the Roman Empire, although there still was consid-
erable opposition within the elites. Many Roman citizens wanted to return
to the ancient, polytheistic tradition. When Rome was taken by ‘Christian
barbarians’ (the Visigoths) in 410, the opposition seized the opportunity to
attack Christianity. In his book, on which he worked for about twenty years,
Augustine gives an apology of Christianity and at the same time attacks Roman
Marin Terpstra 273
32 City of God, 6.9, o.c., pp. 246-247.
33 City of God, 6.10 (o.c., p. 248): “Varro lacked the frankness and courage to criticize the the-
ology of the city with the same freedom he showed towards the theology of the theatre, which resem-
bled it so closely.”
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religion. In this attack, we find important principles for a kind of religious crit-
icism, re-emerging in modern critiques of religion. This, I think, is the true
significance of this work. We are witnessing the “autodépassement” of Chris-
tianity at work. What Augustine wrote in the early fifth century was not very
different from what, for example, Thomas Hobbes wrote about ancient religion
in chapter 12 of the Leviathan, published in 1651. David Hume in his natural
history of religion stays close to the basic scheme of Augustine’s religious crit-
icism, despite his disapproval of the zealous attack on Varro.34 Modern reli-
gious criticism merely has to shift the Christian critique of pagan religion to
Christianity itself. So, one interesting question is how Augustine could develop
a radical critique of religion without being forced to reject Christianity too,
and how it was possible that modern thinkers could develop a general critique
of religion, while accepting the results and the principles of Christian criti-
cism. It seems that Christianity could become the religion for departing from
religion, because it is based on an absolute distinction between true and false
religion, in which truth was critical as such and, ultimately, self-critical.
In the first ten chapters of The city of God, Augustine argues that the Roman
gods did not give the people what they want – to oversimplify a bit. For Augus-
tine, the real question is whether the honour shown to the Roman gods in the
cults, prayers and ceremonies had any effect, either concerning things impor-
tant in this life or concerning the attainment of eternal life. This question is
quite utilitarian. It remains completely within the magical realm of do ut des,
while neglecting, as I will show later, the element of Roman pietas. Accord-
ing to Augustine, the Roman gods were ineffective. There was not even a god
for attaining eternal life! Augustine seems to suggest that believing in the true
God (the God of the Christians), is more effective. In fact, the Christian god
is the only one guaranteeing access to his kingdom, eternal life, of course only
for those who truly believe in this god.
From a modern perspective, we could neglect this kind of criticism, being
merely Christian propaganda or an early example of the language common
to commercials. In this criticism, we also can see a first step in the process of
disenchantment of the world. Augustine shows evidence of a functionalist
approach to religion. Does it help anyone? Do we need it? The magical
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atmosphere of the cult and the prayer is replaced by the language of ‘science’
and ‘technique’. Does any particular action have the intended effect? Is it a
means to a specific end? Augustine’s style shows clear signs of mockery,
which will become a hallmark of modern religious criticism.35 I am not sure
whether Augustine really believed in the efficacy of praying to the true god.
In that case, he would merely shift from an ineffective to an alleged effective
magical worldview. But there is more.
The real issue is not about the effectiveness of religious practices, but about
the very concept of the divine. For Augustine, God is separated from this world,
and so is his kingdom, his civitas. As far as Christians subject themselves to
this transcendent God, and become citizens of the city of God, they too become
separated from this world. The metaphor used by Augustine, as I said before,
is that Christians are strangers in this world, far away from home but longing
to get home. In this world, however, for the time being, they must adjust them-
selves to the way things are. They may even, enlightened by the image of a
perfect city, improve social and political order. Christians are allowed or even
encouraged to invest in this world, but they may never devote themselves to
this world, or to the cities in this world. A civil religion is a sign of false reli-
gion. (Augustine never said it was impossible.)
The Romans, on the contrary, whether they were true believers or whether
they cynically accepted religion as an instrument to safeguard the state, devoted
themselves to the city, to this world. They had no idea of transcendence, except
maybe for some philosophers who seem to have an inkling of ‘the truth’. The
Romans were at home in this world and this, exactly, is their error. They err
without knowing the way home.
A stranger can look at the world from a distance, giving an objective descrip-
tion of the world, while separating his own thoughts from this description.
The stranger becomes a kind of positivist. Maybe we should say that positivism
could only emerge in a culture in which the subject separates itself from the
outside world, as if he had nothing to do with it. Without doubt, when reading
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Augustine, we are still far away from positivism and its religious criticism.
As a stranger, his mind is filled with images of another world that still inter-
feres with his description of this world. In the final analysis, Augustine does
not escape the enchanted world of the ancients, but he gives arguments that
could be used for such an escape.
Augustine’s positivism, his religious criticism, and his attempt to transcend the
enchanted world of the ancients become apparent in his reception of Varro.
He clearly rejects the attempt to restore the religion of the ancestors as a lie.
In fact, he rejects the possibility of the establishment of a perfect civitas, an eter-
nal empire, in this world. This is the critical element inherent in the idea of the
openness of a community. The nostalgia is reinstated as the eternal city appear-
ing at the end of times. Nevertheless, this ‘autodépassement’ of de civitas in the
civitas Dei36 seems to be blind to the characteristic openness of the Roman civil-
isation itself, which also could serve as a way to prevent communal closure.
5. The meaning of the Theologia Tripertita (evaluation)
Although the Romans were more interested in religious practice than in some
form of orthodoxy, there was a real intellectual interest in theology37, which
appeared already in Plato’s work. The three modes of worship, of which Gib-
bon has given a caricature, or the partition in three kinds of theology, show that
the Romans had a differentiated attitude towards religion. They accepted the
need for stories about the Gods. They thought it necessary to stick to the cults,
but for the (intellectual) elite there was room to speculate freely about the
nature of the Gods (cf. Cicero). The only restriction was that these speculations
should be kept indoors in order not to disturb public religion. Augustine, of
course, knew precisely this ‘discretion of the unbelievers’. However, whereas
the intellectual elite of Rome thought this discretion is a virtue and a duty,
Christianity preferred a public truth.38 Christianity replaced this differentiated
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36 Again, Nancy, o.c., p. 212: “L’identité chrétienne est donc d’entrée de jeu une constitution par
autodépassement: la Loi ancienne dans la Loi nouvelle, le logos dans le Verbe, la civitas dans la ci-
vitas Dei, etc.”
37 For an overview of Roman theology in this period, see Elizabeth Rawson, Intellectual Life in
the Late Roman Republic, Duckworth, London 1985, pp. 298ff.
38 City of God, o.c., 6.5, p. 235: “What sensitive ears ordinary people have, including the Roman
people, in matters of religion! They cannot tolerate the discussions of philosophers about the immor-
tal gods. Yet they not merely tolerate, they listen with pleasure to fictions, sung by poets and acted
by players, which offend against the dignity and the nature of the gods […].” One cannot overhear
Plato’s criticism of mythical theology. The alternative to this religious tolerance of the people is the
dictatorship of the truth (or those who know the truth).
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theology by only one theology, based on revelation, claiming truth for all (vera
religio). Augustine seems to reject the difference between esoteric and exoteric
belief, elite and population. Above all, he rejects a political theology, espe-
cially when connected to mythical theology. Modernity in its confrontation
with Christian theology could only reject theology as a whole, because this
was already identified with revelation. But the problem with differentiated the-
ology was that the solution never disappeared, of course. The problem the
Romans solved was raised again (without using the terms of the Romans).
Spinoza wants to make natural theology (the speculations of the intellectual
elite) public.39 This is the start of the Enlightenment. But the spread of science
among the population never succeeded. Should we return to the Roman solu-
tion? What is wiser, distribution of the truth for all, or the virtue of discretion?
To some extent, Augustine is right when pointing to the doctrine of the The-
ologia Tripertita as a sign of embarrassment among the Roman intellectual
elite. Further, Augustine could build on a stream of philosophical religious
criticism, which was already developed among the intellectuals in ancient
Greek and Roman society. This criticism sought to differentiate between true
religion and superstition. Superstition refers to all forms of religion that are not
honourable – for the gods, and for men.40 Nevertheless, Augustine was a little
prejudiced. For him, this world is not the real world. This life is only a pass-
ing life. The real thing is somewhere else. Although this makes possible a crit-
icism of this world, of society as it is, of the violent and ugly faces of the
Roman Empire41, it also makes it difficult to understand and appreciate a
Roman citizen. More importantly, it makes it difficult to assess the general
meaning of the doctrine of the three theologies. Maybe, in the Roman context,
the doctrine was not free of cynicism, but I will argue that its general mean-
ing could transcend cynicism, exactly in the way Hume and Gibbon proposed.
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the right of philosophers to criticize superstitious beliefs and official religion. Now, Augustine is
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40 Dale Martin, Inventing Superstition. From the Hippocratics to the Christians, Harvard Uni-
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points out.
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Augustine did not appraise the reasons why Roman intellectuals made this dif-
ferentiation between kinds of theology; he used this doctrine as an authorita-
tive argument for his claim that Roman religion should be rejected. In this
way, he thought he could convince his opponents in the Roman elite by show-
ing that, for centuries, Roman intellectuals had been of the same opinion as
Augustine. Roman intellectuals, however, were not concerned with eternal life,
in a life hereafter. They were concerned with the eternity of the Roman Empire,
an eternal pax Romana. My point is that Augustine, probably with full con-
sciousness of what he was doing, neglected (1) the political reasoning of the
Roman elite, (2) their affinity with public theatre, decorum, and social for-
malism, and (3) the sceptical tendency of natural theology or philosophy.
In short, the Roman elite were not interested in a public role for the truth.
For them, the quest for truth was part of private, personal development.
6. The (in)discretion of unbelievers – deconstruction of Christianity
revisited
In our world, divided in a powerful secular minority and a religious majority42,
a basic question is what should be the attitude of the unbeliever, confronted as
he is with so many people who are deeply convinced of the existence of things,
of which he is convinced that they are merely the product of imagination. This
problem was posed to many elites: the Roman elite, the Christian elite, and the
elites of modern society as well. The question is how to deal with the truth they
represented? How to deal with the errors of the masses? What Christianity
and Modernity have in common is the propensity, to say the least, of living in
the truth instead of enjoying the myths of society. Of course, in the name of
the truth, one can reject the rule of a monomythical identity, but this is also
possible by a pragmatic acceptance of a plurality of myths.43
Monotheism, on the other hand, although it distanced itself from mythical
theology, went in another direction. Like Plato before him, who set the
paradigm44, Augustine starts from an idea of one true God, or a truth about the
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real nature of God. Augustine, apart from the doubts he has himself, is not a
sceptic, like many Roman authors on the subject of the gods. Cicero confines
himself to an exposition of different schools of philosophers, holding different
ideas about the gods.45 Cicero does not openly deny the existence of the gods.
This point was made, some centuries ago, by David Hume. Secondly, religious
criticism emerges among the intellectuals of ancient Greece46, but it became an
art and developed in a different direction within monotheistic religions. Reli-
gion, reduced to one truth, cannot but reject everything that is false in other reli-
gions. The sceptical point of view, which accepts that talking about gods only
refers to people’s opinions about things, and that the stories about the gods are
made by poets, philosophers and magistrates, is taken up by Augustine as proof
of their falsehood. The point is that Augustine’s emphasis on the opposition
between orthodoxy and heterodoxy, the acceptance or rejection of the one true
God, leads him to underestimate the practical or pragmatic orientation of the
Roman intellectuals. Thirdly, Augustine is an unbeliever in the world of Roman
religion, as most of the Roman intellectuals were. But Augustine could not
accept that something that is false still plays a role in public life. The truth, as
soon as we have found it, should be public. We should live in the truth, and
destroy lies. False religion should be criticized and rejected. Diffidence, cir-
cumspection, discretion are not the virtues Augustine is praising here. He pro-
ceeds from his unbelief in the Roman gods to the exclamation that the Romans
are liars.
All this is deeply rooted in Christianity as an episode in ‘a political history of
religion’ (Marcel Gauchet). Politically speaking, the historical event of Chris-
tianity – i.e. the movement based on the autopoietical organization of the myth
of Jesus Christ as historical intervention of God of a certain kind – means three
things: (1) the rejection of messianic or apocalyptic violence, designed to over-
throw an oppressive regime (Christians did not participate in the Jewish rebel-
lion against the Roman Empire, which resulted in the destruction by the Roman
army of Jerusalem in 70 AC); (2) the rejection of the theologia civilis or state
cult (according to Christians religion should not be a part of political order);
(3) the rejection of a religion identifying itself as withdrawal from the world,
as pure alien to this world, and especially as divine knowledge of salvation
(Gnosis).
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This threefold rejection (including, of course, the ambivalence present in any
rejection) was developed in the first centuries of the history of Christianity
and accomplished by the construction and establishment of a consistent the-
ology, constituting Christianity’s orthodoxy – that is, the right opinion.
Augustine, of course, can be seen as one of the major authors of this ortho-
doxy. Christianity as our horizon is not merely positive, but includes this
negativity. Christianity is not only what it affirms, but also what it rejects.
Christianity disconnected our western culture from archaic and traditional
religions, although it did not succeed in this completely. Therefore, it would
be better to say, that it is the battle of Christianity against its opponents (or
the other way around) which made our culture what it is now. In this sense,
a ‘deconstruction of Christianity’ has to be carried out in a more broadly-
based context. It is not confined to the»juif-grec«. More references are
needed.
If the doctrine of the three kinds of theology was an “intellectual model”
in the Roman world, reflecting a differentiation in theology, one could ask
what position a Christian theology could have in this model. Can this model
be adjusted to the fact of Christianity, as it emerged within the Roman
world? On the one hand, we could simply argue that Christianity puts for-
ward a new source: the witnesses who talk about Jesus Christ, who himself
revealed a divine message. Then we would have a further differentiation of
theology: mythical, political, natural and ‘revelatory’ theology. The ques-
tion would be how these kinds of theology should be related. Christianity
could have been integrated in the Roman religious world. On the other hand,
we could argue, Christianity contains a much stronger claim. Its theology is
the articulation of a revealed truth, of which the acceptance entails a com-
plete rejection of the previous theologies. Christian theology is about uni-
fication, not about differentiation. Christian theology has a tendency towards
exclusion and suppression, maybe even because of its radical turn to an
open ending.
If we look at it from the perspective of political philosophy, the attempt of
Christianity to live in this world without being of this world, without a spiri-
tual investment in this world, constitutes its significance as political revolution.
The transition from civitas to civitas Dei consists of a spiritualization of
political order (i.e. the Roman political order). The political significance of
spiritualization is depoliticization. Christianity, in its anti-Roman effect, deals
with the world and with human beings in view of eternal salvation. It leaves
politics to those wicked people who are prepared to invest in this world. Of
course, there is Roman Christianity, more or less connected to political power,
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the long history of the bond between throne and altar. Nancy’s attachment to
Christianity, however, seems to be completely in line with this anti-Roman
tendency. This affects his notion of community.
7. Conclusion: another communal openness?
We may discern several major themes in the confrontation between the Chris-
tian and Roman worldviews as exemplified by Augustine and Varro. In all
these themes, we must be aware of the asymmetrical nature of the opposition.
A general feature of criticism may be that the terms by which one position
rejects the other have a quite different meaning for the other position. The crit-
icism then never affects the criticized object completely.47 Of course, there is
no space to explore this problem. So, in concluding, I will just comment on
each of these themes.
An interesting point is that the text of Varro has become invisible (and there-
fore unreadable). It is lost, except for the quotations in the books of those who
criticized its content. Nevertheless, this text may change its nature by becom-
ing a Fremdkörper, a Roman texts in a Christian text, distorted but also capa-
ble of distortion. It is this incorporation that can be undone, or that even can
make itself undone, as happened in the eighteenth century when Varro was
turned against Augustine (Montesquieu, Hume, Gibbon and in a more indirect
way Rousseau).
Augustine doubles the invisibility of Varro by a problematic reconstruction
of what Varro really meant. Of course, we do not have the texts to falsify this
claim. The main idea is that Varro was a philosopher who did not believe the
stories about the gods, told by the poets and believed by the people. How-
ever, he accepted the civil theology of Rome, connected to these stories.
Augustine criticizes Varro for not being sincere: he should have said openly
what he thought to be true and rejected publicly what was false. Augustine
recognized in Varro’s philosophy or natural theology (affiliated with the stoic
doctrine) much that was comparable to Christian thought. Of course, this
criticism was directed to the Roman elite, who did not believe in public reli-
gion either, but thought a civil theology was necessary for the state. The
ideas of the philosophers were not very useful in this respect. Augustine
defends that public belief should be truthful. Christianity should be the stan-
dard.
Marin Terpstra 281
47 Cf. Leo Strauss, Spinoza’s Critique of Religion, o.c.
1525-08_Bijdr_08-3_02_Terpstra  09-09-2008  17:11  Pagina 281
The distortion betrays itself as soon as the texts themselves show the possi-
bility of another Varro. The reconstruction of the text of the Antiquitates from
its fragments (accomplished by Cardauns) and other sources that tell us about
the ideas of the Roman elite in the first century BC reveal what is left out by
Augustine. In fact, the text of Augustine that incorporates the texts of Varro
is the sign of a difference, a confrontation, or even a real clash of civiliza-
tions.
Rather than between polytheism versus monotheism, I think the confrontation
is between orthopraxy and orthodoxy, social practice versus (revealed or philo-
sophical) truth. For the Roman position, the falsity attached to its religion is
not denied (at least, not by Varro), but is simply less important because some-
thing else is of more importance. This is the very attitude that, in the eyes of
Augustine, causes neglect of the revealed truth.
For the Romans, the gods are part of society (one should communicate with
the gods as with family, citizens and other human beings in the world). For the
Christians, God is transcendent (more or less: the idea is not developed con-
sistently).
Although Varro, as most of the intellectuals in the Roman elite, was not very
enthusiastic about the public theatre, his basic feeling about public life is the-
atrical. Augustine, for his part, evaluated this Roman inclination to play-act-
ing (doing ‘as if’) as insincere and untrue. For the Romans, however, this the-
atre was part of their piety and public dignity. Christianity’s abhorrence of
theatre entails disenchantment of politics and spiritualization of the real state.
Here, I think, lies an important element of the “autodépassement” inherent to
Christianity, in this case the transformation of the civitas into civitas Dei.
The state or empire is no longer what has to be secured here and now, but is
always still to come.
The basic clash is between spiritual investment in this world (as it is) versus
rejection of this spiritual investment. Christianity does not believe in the per-
fection of this world. Christians remain strangers in this world (and citizens of
another world). Romans accepted a civil religion, mainly for political purposes.
Augustine’s criticism, which may be the main idea of Christianity’s attitude
towards politics, is directed at the heart of Roman Realpolitik. Justice should
replace a clever ruling of the people. The reverse side is that Christianity
refuses political responsibility.
What can we learn from this example with regard to a deconstruction of Chris-
tianity? There is much to say here, but I confine myself to one point. The West
is not identical to Christianity, but to an ongoing confrontation of ways of life
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in which Christianity is only one possible option, always challenged. In a
deconstruction of Christianity, we must be aware that we also take into account
the distortions in Christian texts of this clash itself. In Nancy’s approach, there
seems to be a tendency towards such a differentiated analysis. The audience
he speaks to seems to have made him neglect this other reference and it sim-
plifications.
To finish, let me refer to two topical themes that can be associated with the
confrontation between Varro and Augustine, Roman political-theological cul-
ture and Christianity.
One might be tempted to think that, at least after Christianity, the Christian reli-
gious criticism preserves its effects: the divine has become transcendent. How-
ever, in modern political culture, we still relate to that which founds our polit-
ical order (principles, values, moral constitution). In this sense, the gods are still
part of social life. Political cult could be enacted as an expression of piety,
loyalty to the basic principles of our political order.
Christianity has left its mark on western Enlightenment: the revealed truth
should be public. Lies should be banned from public life. Criticism of false
beliefs should be open. Today, we encounter a secularist radicalism that claims
the right to express its religious criticism in public, even by means of mock-
ery and overt contempt. In this respect, the Roman attitude towards people’s
beliefs, discretion of the unbelievers, present in Varro’s differentiation of kinds
of theology, might still be of importance.
It seems to me that Nancy is inclined to raise the question of our Christian
inheritance and neglect the reference to Rome also because his approach to
society and community, the coming together of people, is not political, but
moral. Nancy has no theory of institutions and its rituals. For him, being
together only relates to meaning (sens), not to practice. The Roman element
in the western world, on the contrary, stresses that our being together is rep-
resented by political institutions. This holds us together, guarantees our free-
dom, at least as long as we respect these institutions (the Roman pietas). Does
it really matter, whether these institutions represent mere fictions that remain
open for everyone to give his own interpretation? It is only in a specific con-
text in which theology and truth are identified, that a civil religion could
develop into a totalitarian project, forcing society into one sense. Because a spe-
cific kind of Christianity has lost the meaning of theology as human way of
dealing with the gods, it has also forgotten about its pragmatic nature. Nancy
cannot differentiate between state cult as theatre and totalitarian forms of state
cult. Theatre always leaves room for interpretation, because the meaning or the
truth of the play is not the important thing. The important thing is that we act
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in the right way. Why should civil religion in this sense be impossible? Why
should we resist it?
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